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This paper explores the sense of touch in relation to social cognition offering a new take 
on multisensory integration in the brain, within the framework of embodied simulation 
(ES) theory. ES provides a new empirically based notion of intersubjectivity, viewed first 
and foremost as intercorporeality. in relation to touch, by means of eS we do not just “see” 
a sensation experienced by someone else and then understand it through an inference 
by analogy. By means of eS we can map others’ sensations by re-using our own motor, 
somatosensory and viscero-motor representations. eS provides an original and unitary 
account of basic aspects of intersubjectivity, demonstrating how deeply our making 
sense of others’ living and acting bodies is rooted in the power of re-using our own motor, 
somatosensory and viscero-motor resources.
EMBODIED SIMULATION  
AND TOUCH: THE SENSE OF  
TOUCH IN SOCIAL COGNITION
vittorio galleSe
università degli Studi di Parma
vittorio.gallese@unipr.it
SJoerd ebiSch
università degli Studi "g. d'annunzio" di Chieti e Pescara
sjoerdebisch@yahoo.com
270
in our title “the sense of touch”  the word ‘sense’ is written in italic to 
emphasize how the sensory modality of touch is crucially involved in the 
constitution of the sense we attribute to the world.
in his The Visible and the invisible (1968) the French philosopher merleau-Ponty 
wrote: “What there is then are not things firs identical with themselves, which 
would then offer themselves to the seer […] – but something to which we could 
not be closer than by palpating it with our look, things we could not dream 
of seeing ‘all naked’ because the gaze itself envelopes them, clothes them 
with its own flesh” (p. 131). In this famous passage Merleau-Ponty notably 
emphasizes, on the one hand, the haptic quality of our gaze and, on the other, 
the intrinsic motor nature of our sensory explorations of the world. as aptly 
noted by derrida (2005, p.143), merleau-Ponty when writing about touch was 
influenced, beside Husserl, also by the French philosopher Maine de Biran 
(1766-1823) to whom he devoted a series of lectures in 1947-48. 
maine de biran, whose philosophy challenged the standard sensist notion 
of the senses and consciousness as mere passive perceptions, emphasizing 
instead the central role of effort and motor will, indeed wrote: “it is 
only, therefore, as a motor organ that touch contributes essentially to 
putting the individual in communication with external nature; it is 
because it combines the two faculties in the most exact proportion that 
it is susceptible of such nice, such detailed, such persistent impressions; 
in short, it is in virtue of this that it opens a feeding ground for intellect 
and furnishes it with its more substantial nourishment” (1929, p. 61). and 
two pages later continues: “For that matter, we can apply to sight almost 
all that we have said of touch. in the natural state and in the ordinary 
exercise of the organ, the two functions – sensory and motor – correspond 
with and balance each other with no mutual disturbance” (ibid., p. 63). 
as we show in the present article, maine de biran’s words are not metaphors, 
since they envisage what cognitive neuroscience has demonstrated during 
the last two decades: the pervasiveness of multimodal integration in our brain 
and the crucial role of action and of the motor system in enabling multimodal 
sensory integration. the results of the empirical brain research we present 
here demonstrate how vision, touch and action are inextricably related, so 
that our visual perception of the tactile experience of others systematically 
leads to the activation of our motor and somatosensory systems. before 
addressing these issues, however, we offer a brief overview of how the cortical 
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somatosensory system is organized and how such organization relates to the 
notions of unimodality and multimodality. 
‘tactile stimuli’, like a caress on our hand or a slap on our face, are indeed 
mechanical events occurring at the periphery of our body, where specialized 
neurons, called receptors, transduce mechanical energy into action potentials. 
Several pathways originating by somatosensory receptors variously distributed 
all over the body travel within the central nervous system and the third 
cranial nerve. After several relays at the level of the brainstem and of specific 
thalamic nuclei, they reach the neocortex. the human neocortex is traditionally 
subdivided in different, functionally and anatomically segregated regions. 
behind the central sulcus sits the primary somatosensory area, also known 
as Si composed of 4 distinct cytoarchitectonic areas, brodmann’s area (ba) 
3a, 3b, 1 and 2. the secondary somatosensory area, Sii, is buried within the 
depth of the lateral sulcus. both Si and Sii receive the somatosensory-related 
thalamic inputs, and are traditionally considered to be unimodally related to 
the processing of somatosensory stimuli, like touch, proprioception, pain and 
temperature. as we show in the present article, this unimodal modular view 
doesn’t hold anymore. 
thus, sensory and motor circuits in the brain that directly guide the 
interactions between our body and the external world through action and 
perception also likely contribute to the conceptualization of what we observe 
in the world around us (gallese and lakoff 2005; gallese and Sinigaglia 2011). 
in other words, they are supposed to neurally generate bodily formatted 
representational content about what we perceive in that world. 
The body typified by the German philosopher edmund Husserl as “a thing 
inserted between the rest of the material world and the subjective sphere” 
(1989, p.161), clearly accentuates the unique and central position of the lived 
body between the mental/subjective and the physical/objective (husserl, 
1989). or, as put by merleau-Ponty (1962), “i perceive with my body” (p. 326), 
“we are in the world through our body and in so far as we perceive the world 
with our body [...] perceiving as we do with our body, the body is a natural 
self and, as it were, the subject of perception” (p. 239). consequently, the body 
overcomes the divide between the physical and the mental “if we introduce 
the phenomenal body beside the objective one, if we make a knowing body of 
it” (p. 278).
at the neural level, a necessary condition to meet for sensory and motor 
systems in order to serve our knowledge of the world is multimodality (e.g., 
gallese and lakoff 2005). that is, in order to entertain the capacity to generate 
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knowledge, like knowledge about others’ mental states and behaviors,  
neurons should respond to more than one modality. this view is completely 
different from the still dominant view in classic cognitive science, according 
to which our conceptual knowledge of the world is supported by amodal 
representations that result from abstract, symbolic computation (Fodor 
1975, 1983). traditionally, a clear distinction was made between modular 
structures for action and perception, and supramodal association areas linking 
different modality specific areas. However, accumulating empirical evidence 
suggests that sensory and motor systems  are multimodal and directly linked 
systems, responding to and processing information associated with multiple 
modalities. not coincidentally, the interactions of our body with the external 
world, including other living bodies, are actually multimodal. For instance, in 
the case of action, one could argue that action performance contains motor 
components as well as various perceptual contents, like vision (what does the 
action look like, what are the visuospatial characteristics of the object), sounds 
(what kind of sound accompanies a particular action), somatosensations (body-
object interaction, proprioception) and localization in space. the same applies 
to ouch. in the following sections we show how the sensory modality of touch, 
both when subjectively experienced and when observed being experienced by 
others, relies on dynamic processes of multimodal integration, encompassing 
the activation of somatomotor and visceromotor cortical networks.
empirical evidence consistently supports multimodal properties of sensory 
and motor systems as they appear not exclusively dedicated to inputs from a 
specific modality. By contrast, they rather tend to respond to more than one 
modality. concerning somatosensory systems, a number of studies showed 
that tactile processing is not confined to somatosensory cortex, but that 
other brain regions, traditionaly thought to subserve sensory modalities 
other than touch, are indeed involved in somatosensory processing too. 
For instance, bolognini et al. (2010) demonstrated by means of transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (tmS) that the cortical region of the superior 
temporal gyrus, generally considered an auditory modality-specific area, 
is involved not only in auditory processing, but also in temporal aspects of 
somatosensory processing. Furthermore, a functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fmri) study reported that also primary visual cortex responds to 
tactile input (merabet et al. 2007). in addition, by using neural tracers, it was 
shown that the primary visual cortex of macaques receives both direct and 
indirect connections from auditory and somatosensory cortices, providing 
an anatomical basis for a highly integrative functioning among sensory 
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systems (see borra and rockland 2011).
likewise, also the motor system is endowed with multisensory properties. 
Several studies consistently showed that premotor and parietal areas 
contain neurons that perceptually respond to visual, auditory and 
somatosensory inputs (Fogassi et al. 1992, 1996; gentilucci et al. 1983, 1988; 
rizzolatti et al. 1988, 1997; graziano et al. 1994, 1997, 1999).
a peculiar example in this context is ventral premotor area F4 in macaque 
monkeys’ agranular frontal cortex (matelli et al. 1985), part of a circuit that 
maps specific sensory events in the space near the body onto arm and head 
movements (rizzolatti and luppino 2001). a large proportion of F4 neurons 
has bimodal properties responding to both somatosensory and visual 
stimuli (Fogassi et al. 1996). Visual receptive fields of F4 neurons are mostly 
located in the space near the monkey (peripersonal space) and typically 
extend in the space adjacent to the tactile receptive fields of the same 
neurons.
Based on their somatocentered receptive fields (RFs), neurons in F4 are 
suggested to be involved in space perception. in particular, their rFs are 
anchored to a particular body part and when the body part is moved, the 
rF moves along with it (Fogassi et al. 1996; graziano and gross 1998). hence, 
it has been proposed that area F4 could be involved in the integration of 
multisensory information from vision, touch and proprioception onto the 
motor representations of different body parts (Fogassi et al. 1996; graziano 
2001; rizzolatti et al. 2002). 
Several studies identified a putative human homologue of monkey area F4 
in premotor cortex. With respect to its multisensory properties, bremmer et 
al. (2001) demonstrated by means of fmri that the ventral aspect of human 
premotor cortex responds to visual, auditory and tactile stimuli. more 
recently, a repetitive TMS study showed a specific disruption of audio-tactile 
interactions around the hand, showing the crucial role of human premotor 
cortex in the processing of multisensory stimuli within peripersonal space 
(Serino et al. 2011).
beside providing evidence for multimodal processing in the sensory-motor 
system, these findings bear more general significance. Let’s ask the following 
question: how do premotor F4 neurons “perceptually” work? a likely and 
intriguing answer to this question is, by means of embodied simulation. that is, 
perceiving an object or event through one of the senses at a given location within 
peripersonal space evokes the motor simulation of the most appropriate actions 
towards that very same spatial location (rizzolatti et al. 1997; gallese 2005). 
the embodied simulation hypothesis is supported by the fact that F4 neurons 
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discharge not only when an object is present in the peripersonal space, but also 
when the monkey believes the object is still present, while the object has been 
removed without the knowledge of the monkey (graziano et al. 1997). thus, space 
representation in the premotor cortex can be generated not only as a consequence 
of an external, multisensory stimulation, but also internally on the basis of 
previous experience.
Although the recognition of the contribution of first-person bodily 
experiences to consciousness and knowledge can be traced back in modern 
times to the philosophical school of phenomenology (e.g., edmund husserl, 
merleau-Ponty), or to 19th century psychology (e.g., William James), it is 
mainly since the discovery of mirror neurons in area F5 within the ventral 
premotor cortex of macaque monkeys (di Pellegrino et al. 1992; gallese et al. 
1996; rizzolatti et al. 1996) that the idea of understanding the world around 
us in terms of the way we function with our bodies in that world gained 
wide attention in neuroscience. neurons in premotor area F5 are known to 
code goal-related motor acts, like hand and mouth grasping. Surprisingly, 
many of these neurons (called, mirror neurons) were found to be activated 
not only when the monkey performed a particular object-related action, 
but also when the monkey observed someone else performing the same action. 
neurons with similar mirror properties were later on also found in regions of 
the inferior parietal lobe reciprocally connected with area F5 (Fogassi et al. 2005; 
Petrides & Pandya 1984; rozzi et al. 2006).
In accordance with these findings in monkeys, a similar mirror mechanism 
mapping action perception on motor representations of the observer’s brain 
was revealed in humans by many studies through different methodologies, 
including fmri, Pet, meg, eeg, tmS (rizzolatti et al. 1996; see for reviews 
rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2010; rizzolatti and craighero 2004; gallese and 
Sinigaglia 2011). it was proposed that the mirror mechanism might underpin 
basic aspects of social cognition and empathy (gallese 2003; gallese et al. 2004) 
on the basis of its documanted involvement in the understanding of action goals 
(Umiltà et al. 2001, 2008; rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2007; gazzola et al. 2007) and 
basic motor intentions (iacoboni et al. 2005; Fogassi et al. 2005), with behaviors 
like imitation (iacoboni et al. 1999; rizzolatti et al. 2001), complementary actions 
(newman-norlund et al. 2007) and with the semantics of action-related words 
and sentences (hauk et al. 2004; tettamanti et al. 2005; aziz-Zadeh et al. 2006; 
Pulvermuller et al. 2005).
the multisensory properties of mirror neurons are highlighted by studies 
showing that they not only respond to visual input, but also to the sounds 
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of specific actions (Kohler et al. 2002; Keysers et al. 2003; Gazzola et al. 
2006). the relevance of this discovery is that it allows a direct mapping of 
the perception of an action onto the perceiver’s motor representation of 
the same action. the sensory representation of another’s action is mapped 
onto one’s own motor representation of the same action (e.g., rizzolatti et 
al. 2001). in other words, one’s own motor knowledge is used to understand 
the action of another agent by means of embodied simulation (see gallese 
2003 2005; gallese and Sinigaglia 2011).
Probably, mirror neurons for action are just the tip of the iceberg, representing 
one specific aspect of a more general mirror mechanism (MM) that uses bodily 
formatted representations of goals, emotions, body states and sensations to map 
the same states in other individuals (goldman and gallese 2000; gallese 2003, 
2005; gallese et al. 2004; gallese and Sinigaglia 2011). indeed, empirical evidence 
from numerous neurophysiological, neuroimaging and behavioral studies 
confirmed this initial hypothesis that a similar mirror mechanism could be 
applied to the social perception of other mental states and bodily experiences as 
well (see Keysers and gazzola 2009; gallese and Sinigaglia 2011). 
by using different techniques and methodologies, a vast series of studies 
corroborates this conclusion by showing that the same cortical regions 
underlying the first-person experience of emotions and sensations are also 
activated when witnessing others’ emotions (carr et al. 2003; Wicker et al. 2003; 
leslie et al. 2004; Pfeifer et al. 2008) and sensations, like touch (see Keysers et 
al., 2010), pain (hutchison et al. 1999; morrison et al. 2004; Singer et al. 2004; 
botvinick et al. 2005;  Jackson et al. 2005; avenanti et al. 2005) and pleasant touch 
(mccabe et al. 2008).
the theory of embodied simulation (gallese 2003, 2005; gallese and Sinigaglia 
2011) provides a unified theoretical framework for all of these phenomena. It 
proposes that our social perceptions become meaningful by means of re-using 
our own mental states or processes in functionally attributing them to others. 
Here, we refer to simulation as an automatic, unconscious, pre-reflective 
mechanism of the brain-body system, whose function is to model, objects, 
agents and events, and which is triggered by perception (gallese 2005), although 
is plastically modulated by contextual, cognitive and personal identity-related 
factors. this neurobiological perspective on the notion of simulation holds that 
the same neural structures involved in our own bodily self-experiences are also 
involved with the pre-reflective understanding of the behaviors and of some 
mental states of other individuals.
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the tactile dimension, i.e., touch, plays a peculiar role in our interaction 
with the external world. The sense of touch is the first to develop before all 
other senses, and is the most important sense allowing infants to initially 
learn about their inanimate and animate environment, and their bonds 
with it. concerning the animate world, touch plays a pivotal role in social 
interactions subserving a nonverbal communication of intentions and affect 
through somatosensory stimulation of another individual. in contrast to 
the other senses, it is present all over the body. moreover, it is crucial for the 
awareness of our own body in relationship with the external world based 
on both external perceptions (i.e., touch) and internal perceptions (i.e., 
proprioception). as posited by edmund husserl, everything we see, we also 
see it as a tactile object, as something directly related to the lived body, and 
not just by virtue of its visibility (husserl 1989).
a substantial amount of studies points to manifold functions accommodated 
by the somatosensory system. For example, Zhou and Fuster (2000) found 
that monkeys’ Si neurons responded also to visual stimuli, if these were 
previously associated with tactile experiences. a very recent study 
revealed within macaque monkeys’ area Sii the presence of purely motor, 
hand grasping-related neurons (ishida et al. 2013). Since lesion of Sii 
produces tactile agnosia (caselli 1991; reed and caselli 1994, 1996), that 
is, the inability to recognize objects by means of their haptic exploration 
(valenza et al. 2001), these newly discovered neurons might likely provide 
the somato-motor binding principle enabling the translation of diachronic 
somatosensory inputs fed by peripheral receptors into a coherent image 
of the explored object. indeed, the german philosopher hans Jonas (1973) 
posited that tactile qualities like roughness and smoothness, in order to 
be experienced, require a series of dynamic somatosensory sensations 
obtained by means of friction and pressure of the fingers, that is, by means 
of movement.
moreover, if we move to the domain of social cognition, a series of fmri 
studies demonstrated activation of a shared neural circuitry in primary 
(Si) and secondary (Sii) somatosensory cortices, which is normally involved 
in our experience of touch, during the observation of another person 
being touched (Keysers et al. 2004; blakemore et al. 2005; ebisch et al. 2008, 
2011; Schaefer et al. 2009; meyer et al. 2011; Kuehn et al. 2012, 2013). the 
involvement of somatosensory cortex in touch observation was subsequently 
replicated by means of somatosensory-evoked potentials (bufalari et al. 2007), 
magnetoencephalography (Pikho et al. 2010) as well as tmS and lesion studies 
(bolognini et al. 2011, 2012; rossetti et al. 2012). Whereas meg provides a more 
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direct, but still correlational measure of neural activity related to a given 
function at a high temporal resolution, tmS and lesion data suggest a causal 
role of brain regions in specific functions. 
Keysers et al. (2004) additionally demonstrated that activation of this shared 
mechanism for touch in Sii also occurred for the sight of an object being 
touched. thus, in order to activate a shared neural circuitry for touch by 
vision, it does not matter what is being touched (animate or inanimate) 
as long as touch occurs. In accordance with the latter finding, action 
observation studies consistently show somatosensory activation when 
witnessing bodies interacting with objects (gazzola et al. 2009; ramsay et al. 
2011; turella et al. 2012). 
although not systematically investigated, psychological evidence supports a 
role of mental simulation also in the predictive coding of others’ peripheral 
sensations (bosbach et al. 2005). neuroimaging studies suggested that 
predicting the consequences of observed object-directed actions involves 
the somatosensory cortex (ramsey et al. 2011; morrison et al. 2012). Further 
studies using fmri showed that Si is activated both when participants view 
a hand being stimulated by an object as well as when an object is moving 
in the space close to the hand, but not when moving far from the hand 
(Schaefer et al. 2012). one independent set of data further support the 
notion that predictive responses of multimodal somatosensory-related areas 
map the augmented probability for touch to occur for movements within 
others’ peripersonal space, on the basis of embodied simulation. indeed, 
single neurons recordings in macaque monkeys showed that parietal area 
7b and the ventral intraparietal area (viP), contain visuo-tactile neurons 
that respond both to visual stimuli moved within monkeys’ peripersonal 
space, approaching tacile rFs on the monkey’s body and to the observation 
of similar stimuli approaching equivalent parts of the experimenter’s body 
(ishida et al. 2010).
in another fmri study, when directly contrasting the observation of animate 
and inanimate touch, stronger Si responses were detected by fmri for the 
sight of intentional, animate touch, compared to accidental, inanimate touch 
(ebisch et al. 2008). The intensity of neural activation in this area significantly 
correlated with the degree of intentionality of the observed touching 
stimuli as rated by participants, even when intentionality only was assumed 
by the observer. This finding suggests that SI, in addition to simulation of 
others’ tactile experiences, could also be involved in the simulation of the 
proprioceptive aspects related to the act of touching. indeed, brodmann’s area 
2 in Si has been associated with proprioceptive functions, in addition to tactile 
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perception (gardner and Kandel, 2000).
With respect to more affective aspects of social perception, somatosensory 
cortex function has also been linked to empathic ability (Zaki et al. 2009; 
Schaefer et al. 2012) or the recognition of emotional expressions (adolphs 
et al. 2000; Pitcher et al. 2008). Few studies reported modulation of the 
activation either of Si (bufalari et al. 2007; bolognini et al. 2013) or of 
posterior Sii (ebisch et al. 2011) by the affective valence or intensity of 
observed social touch. 
Finally, few studies further supported the hypothesis that embodied 
simulation processes in somatosensory cortex contribute to the 
conceptualization of our perceptions in the external world, even in the 
absence of animate involvement. ebisch et al. (2008) showed that an 
automatic tendency to activate brain areas involved in the processing 
of our own experience of touch applies to the observation of any touch. 
Specifically, SII activation occurred independently of whether the observed 
touch was intentional or accidental, and independent of whether an 
observed touched object was animate or inanimate. this may suggest 
that embodied simulation principles apply to the understanding of more 
abstract events, too (see Keysers et al. 2004; gallese 2005; ebisch et al. 
2008). accordingly, an fmri study by lacey et al. (2012) provided evidence 
for activation in somatosensory cortex associated with the processing of 
metaphors from the domain of texture, suggesting that comprehension 
of metaphors could be perceptually grounded by means of embodied 
simulation in sensory systems. These findings therefore support the 
activation of an ‘‘abstract’’ notion of touch in somatosensory cortices, 
building on the neural mechanisms for interpreting actual touch even 
for inanimate contact and metaphors, where abstraction is the likely 
prelinguistic outcome of a multimodal integration mechanism (see lakoff 
and gallese 2005; gallese 2008). it is worth noting that already in the Xviii 
century the italian philospher gianbattista vico wrote that “…n’tutte le 
lingue la maggior parte dell’espressioni d’intorno a cose inanimate son 
fatte con trasporti del corpo umano e delle sue parti e degli umani sensi e 
dell’umane passioni” (1725-1744, p. 284).1 
thus, although the somatosensory system is obviously endowed with tactile 
properties (e.g., Kaas 1983; Ferretti et al. 2003), the data here concisely reviewed 
suggest that its functions extend well beyond its classic role in the personal 
1 “thus we discover the important principle that every language, no matter how copious and 
learned, encounters the hard necessity of expressing spiritual things by means of relationships 
with corporeal things.”
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perception of somatic sensations. regarding the social domain, a somatosensory 
mirror mechanism may allow individuals to map others’ bodily experiences on 
their own bodily formatted somatosensory representations. in other words, by 
exploiting the same neural circuits as those recruited for first-person bodily 
experiences, a direct inter-subjective link is established between self and other 
allowing an experiential understanding of others bodily feelings (gallese 2003).
although a vast amount of empirical studies shows that neural circuits 
allowing first-person bodily experiences contribute to the understanding 
of similar experiences in other individuals (Keysers and gazzola 2009; 
gallese 2003, 2005), an intriguing, but poorly investigated issue remains 
how a self-other distinction is established. in addition to the importance 
of a pre-reflective, experiential understanding of others’ by re-using our 
own mental states and processes, one could argue that it would be equally 
crucial to discriminate to whom these feelings and experiences belong 
(e.g., banissy et al. 2009; eisenberg et al. 1989; batson et al. 1987). in other 
words, in functional empathic experiences, there is no complete overlap 
between oneʼs own and othersʼ mental states. Others’ experiences, which 
are empathically shared, nevertheless are experienced as belonging to the 
other. 
From a phenomenological perspective, such self-other discrimination is 
considered constitutive for the perception and understanding of others’ 
behavior and mental states, a crucial aspect of empathy. For instance, edith 
Stein (1989) defined empathy as “the experience of foreign consciousness 
in general” (p. 11). here, she not solely emphasized the experiential aspect 
of empathy, like an intersubjective sharing of the experiences of others 
as similar to us, but she also emphasized the preservation of otherness. 
as stated by Stein (1989), “the subject of empathizing is not the subject 
empathizing, but another, a foreign mind” (p.10) and so “the experience of 
foreign consciousness can only be the non-primordial experience which 
announces a primordial one” (p. 14). thus, unlike our own experiences, 
which are primordially given, empathy does not have this primordiality. as 
further emphasized by Zahavi (2010, 2001), it is because of this asymmetry, 
that the minds we experience are experienced as other minds. also according 
to husserl, “had one had the same access to the other’s consciousness as to 
one’s own, the other would have ceased being another, and would instead 
have become a part of oneself” (husserl 1973, p. 139, transl. Zahavi 2010). 
thus, empathy does not consist of experiencing the other’s behaviors and 
mental states in the same way as the other does. others’ mental states are 
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essentially experienced as belonging to a foreign mind, without being in the 
same state as the other. in other words, we do not necessarily experience the 
specific contents of others’ (tactile) experiences, but experience others as 
having (tactile) experiences similar to ours.
how can this self-other discrimination be reconciled with an empathic 
sharing of others’ states based on vicarious brain activity in the sensory-
motor system and be translated into brain function? Part of the answer can 
be found in the intensity of vicarious activity. blakemore and colleagues 
(2005) investigated by means of fmri scanning brain activation for the 
observation of touch in a case of vision-touch synaesthesia, that is, a person 
for whom the observation of another person being touched is experienced 
as tactile stimulation on the equivalent part of her own body. the sensory-
motor system including somatosensory cortex, premotor cortex and 
anterior insula, responsible for first-person tactile experiences, showed 
stronger activation for the vision of touch in the case of vision-touch 
synaesthesia, compared to participants not affected by this condition. 
this led the authors to conclude that an abnormal intensity of vicarious 
activation may lead to the actual experience of first-person bodily 
experiences, even though not primordially given. 
Furthermore, it has been proposed that the extent of vicarious activity 
could contribute to the distinction between self and other as well. Usually, 
there is no complete overlap between first-person tactile experiences and 
the observation of similar experiences in other individuals. Studies showed 
that witnessing others being touched only activated part of somatosensory 
cortex that is activated when actually experiencing touch (Keysers et al. 
2010). in particular, neuroimaging studies reviewed by Keysers et al. (2010) 
show vicarious activation in Sii as well as in ba 1 and 2 (part of Si), while ba 
3 seems to be reserved for processing tactile perceptions of one’s own body. 
the absence of vicarious activation in certain regions of primary sensory 
cortex could be co-responsible for the absence of real bodily perceptions 
when just witnessing them in others.
Finally, this issue was recently more specifically addressed by means of 
fmri (ebisch et al. 2011). in this study, healthy participants watched other 
individuals being touched on their hands in different ways and, at the end 
of the experiment, were touched on their hands themselves. the results 
demonstrated overlapping activation for the experience and observation 
of touch in several sensory-motor regions, including Sii and premotor 
cortex. however, differential activation was found for the experience and 
observation of touch in the posterior insular cortex (pIC). Specifically, 
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neural activation in pic was positively modulated when participants were 
touched themselves, but negatively modulated (i.e., suppressed compared to 
baseline) when they observed social-affective touch in other individuals. 
pic is considered central to interoceptive functions (craig 2002). 
anatomically, thalamo-cortical pathways that provide afferent information 
to pic, and interactions with limbic, somatosensory and motor regions could 
be at the basis of the role of pic in the awareness of bodily feelings, including 
threatening or comforting information from the skin (augustine 1996; Saper 
2002; critchley 2005; craig 2009; olausson et al. 2002; loken et al. 2009). 
in accordance with the idea of pic as a central cortical node in a system 
constituting a neural representation of ‘the material me’ (craig 2002), a 
series of studies also show that pic contributes to self-awareness. tsakiris 
et al. (2007) found a relationship between neural activation in pic and the 
subjective experience of the rubber hand illusion (rhi: a condition in which 
an observed rubber hand synchronously stroked with participants’ unseen 
hand is subjectively experienced as if it actually were one’s own hand).
in line with the proposed pic function in the awareness of the physiological 
state of the body, a close link between the awareness of the physical and the 
physiological self was suggested during the rhi (moseley et al. 2008). pic has 
further been related to the awareness of body parts in anosognosia patients 
with hemiplegia/hemiparesis (Karnath et al. 2005), and to the sense of agency 
(Farrer et al. 2003).  
taking into account the view of pic as a brain region crucially involved with 
body-related feelings and body awareness, the opposite activation pattern 
we reported for the experience and observation of touch in pic (ebisch et 
al. 2011) could reflect its role in the differentiation between self and other 
tactile conditions. Such a function is further corroborated by a recent 
lesion study investigating the neural basis of illusory own-body perceptions 
(Heydrich and Blanke 2013). Specifically, heautoscopy, a condition associated 
with the visual perception of a second own body, a strong self-identification 
with that second own body, and the experience of existing at and perceiving 
the world from two places at the same time, could be related to lesions in 
left pic. importantly, autoscopic hallucinations where a second own body is 
seen without any changes in bodily self-consciousness, are related to lesions 
in right occipital cortex, but not in pic.
on the basis of the evidence summarized in this article, it can be proposed 
that the pre-reflective side of (tactile) social perception as captured by the 
theory of embodied simulation and by phenomenology may emerge as a 
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rather multifaceted function that relies on a dynamic interaction between, 
on the one hand, embodied simulation processes within shared neural 
networks grounding an implicit understanding of othersʼ behaviors and 
mental states (gallese, Keysers, and rizzolatti, 2004; gallese 2003), and, on 
the other, processes allowing one to maintain a coherent and unique sense 
of self, comprising  self-other discrimination (ebisch et al. 2011, 2012; de 
Waal, 2008; cheng et al. 2007; lamm et al. 2007; batson et al. 1987). according 
to this perspective, identity and alterity – together with reciprocity – are 
necessary and intertwined  dimensions of intersubjectivity.
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